NKHR Calls for EU Action on North Korean Forced Labour at European Parliament Meeting
Exchange of views with the Delegation for relations with the Korean Peninsula, European Parliament - Intervention by Joanna Hosaniak, Deputy Director General, Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)

Distinguished Chair Luena, Vice-Chairs and Honourable Members of the European Parliament,
I wish to thank the Delegation for the invitation to address you today on behalf of the Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR).
Our three recent investigative reports show that forced labour and other grave human rights violations, export of goods, and the development of the weapons program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK/North Korea) do not constitute separate issues. They form a single system based on exploitation, operated by the same military and security organs of the State.
Trade with the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, and through them with global markets, has become a principal source of revenue for these organs. It derives from the export of consumer goods and minerals produced in prisons, and from the trafficking of workers for forced labour abroad. This revenue sustains the system of repression within the country and finances weapons that are exported to zones of armed conflict. Part of what this system produces also enters the European market.
Findings of the report “Made in China”
Our report Made in China examines Chongori Kyohwaso No. 12, a prison camp in direct proximity to the Rason Special Economic Zone and the border with China. Around 80 per cent of its approximately 1,000 prisoners are women forcibly repatriated from China. They produce wigs, false eyelashes, rattan bags and garments for export for up to twenty hours a day, and failure to meet quotas is punished by reduced food rations. While the prison authorities profit, starvation, disease and violence contribute to an estimated annual mortality rate of 25 per cent.
Raw materials come from Chinese companies and the finished products are exported as “Made in China” through Rason Zone under an outsourcing arrangement. Chinese customs data indicate that approximately 80 per cent of China's outsourced processing imports of these products originate in North Korea, and that between January and August 2026 they remained North Korea's largest export to China, worth USD 134 million.
Findings of the report “Financing Oppression and Weapons Program”
Our second report, Financing Oppression and Weapons Program, prepared with investigators from Transparency International Russia, documents the state-organised trafficking of North Korean workers to Russia. Civilian and military personnel are sent on student visas, and more than 70 identified Russian companies disguised their pay as scholarships of up to 66 times the Russian average. The report also identifies more than 100 North Korea-linked entities in Russia, several connected to the nuclear and missile program.
Department 93 and the 131 Nuclear Guidance Bureau, responsible for uranium mining and missile development have financed its weapons program for over a decade through military forced labour on Russian construction sites. Several Russian enablers, including agricultural and textile companies with ties to the Russian military, maintain networks in the EU market. None has been sanctioned, including under human rights sanctions regimes.
Findings of the report “Sailing Sanctions”
Our most recent report, Sailing Sanctions, published on 30 June 2026, tracked 47 coal vessels with the maritime analysts of Data Desk. Sightings of large vessels at North Korea's ports rose almost fivefold, from 783 in 2019 to 3,756 in 2025, with the sharpest increase after the Russian veto ended the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts in 2024.
North Korea's extractive industry rests on inter-generational slavery: political prisoners, and the descendants of South Korean prisoners of war are confined to the mines through a hereditary caste system. Coal exports are controlled by enterprises of the Ministry of National Defence, and the proceeds, held at Chinese banks, directly finance military procurement. The report identifies 20 high-risk coal vessels not yet designated under any sanctions regime.
Monitoring gaps in the ports of the Republic of Korea
These findings are directly relevant to the Republic of Korea (ROK), a strategic partner of the European Union. In July and August 2026, more than 176,000 tonnes of fuel were loaded at Korean ports onto seven tankers bound for the Russian Far East, at least three of them under EU sanctions. Although the ROK has not imposed comprehensive sanctions on Russia, these shipments call into question the conduct of businesses linked to armed conflict. On 17 November 2026, NKHR’s Ethical Trade and Transparency Hub, launched in July 2026 to monitor supply chains and due diligence in East Asia, called in an open letter to President Lee Jae Myung for a full and public investigation.
We are deeply concerned that the same gaps in port monitoring and business oversight by ROK may open routes for expansion of North Korea’s export of goods linked to human rights abuses and evasion of UN sanctions on North Korea, which prohibit its coal exports, ship-to-ship transfers and limit its fuel imports. Fuel transferred at sea off Korean ports could be redirected to North Korea through Russia or China, and the same routes could carry North Korean coal onward. The ROK has acted on such cases before, seizing the Lighthouse Winmore in 2017 for transferring refined petroleum to a North Korean vessel, and detaining the Prada, previously recorded loading coal at Nampo, in July 2026.
The ROK has no general law requiring companies to conduct human rights due diligence across their supply chains. Several bills are before the National Assembly, the most recent introduced on 27 August 2026.
Recommendations
We respectfully request that the Delegation take the following steps.
1. Write to the European Commission asking it to list North Korea as a country at high risk of state-imposed forced labour in the forced labour risk database now under development, and to identify the Rason, Dandong and Hunchun hubs as areas of the highest risk for outsourcing production to North Korea and for the distribution of North Korean forced labour goods to international markets.
2. Ask the Commission to investigate and prepare cases under the Forced Labour Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/3015), which will apply from 14 December 2027, concerning North Korea’s transnational supply chains that rely on forced labour, in particular wigs and eyelashes entering the EU market through outsourced processing in China, and Russian agricultural and textile companies that use North Korean forced labour and have investors or buyers in the EU.
3. Urge the Council of the European Union to designate Department 93, the 131 Nuclear Guidance Bureau, the Russian enablers listed in our database and the 20 high-risk vessels under the EU's restrictive measures against the DPRK and the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime.
4. As the EU leads the drafting of UN resolutions on the human rights situation in the DPRK, encourage the Council and the European External Action Service to propose that the Human Rights Council resolution appoint a Panel of Experts. Its mandate should cover the structures of the State, the chain of command of the military and security forces, and their participation in the international supply chains and business networks that profit from human rights abuses.
5. Consider convening a joint hearing of this Delegation with the Committee on International Trade and the Subcommittee on Human Rights before the Forced Labour Regulation applies, with the participation of North Korean survivors and expert witnesses.
6. The European Parliament last adopted a resolution on the human rights situation in North Korea in April 2022, calling on the DPRK to end its state-sponsored forced labour program. We kindly ask Members of this Delegation to work with their political groups to propose a new resolution that addresses North Korea as a high-risk state for forced labour in global supply chains and the entities that profit from large-scale human rights abuses, including engaged in human trafficking for forced labor between North Korea and Russia and that reflects the recommendations set out here.
7. Set safeguards for any future resumption of inter-Korean trade. The EU–Korea Free Trade Agreement already provides for a joint committee to determine whether goods produced in outward processing zones on the Korean Peninsula, such as the former Kaesong Industrial Complex, may qualify as originating in the Republic of Korea. Any such decision should require compliance with international labour standards, and goods produced in violation of these standards should be subject to scrutiny under the Forced Labour Regulation.
8. At the next Interparliamentary Meeting, encourage counterparts in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea to adopt a mandatory human rights due diligence law, legislation providing a legal basis for targeted human rights sanctions, and an import ban with a rebuttable presumption of forced labour for goods originating in North Korea.
Thank you for your attention.








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